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Abstract
Empirical research has shown that the processing of words and sentences is
accompanied by activation of the brain’s motor system in language users.
The degree of precision observed in this activation seems to be contingent
upon (1) the meaning of a linguistic construction and (2) the depth with
which readers process that construction. In addition, neurological evidence
shows a correspondence between a disruption in the neural correlates of
overt action and the disruption of semantic processing of language about
action. These converging lines of evidence can be taken to support the hy-
potheses that motor processes (1) are recruited to understand language
that focuses on actions and (2) contribute a unique element to conceptual
representation. This article explores the role of this motor recruitment in
language comprehension. It concludes that extant ﬁndings are consistent
with the theorized existence of multimodal, embodied representations of
the referents of words and the meaning carried by language. Further, an in-
tegrative conceptualization of ‘‘fault tolerant comprehension’’ is proposed.
Keywords
language comprehension, embodied cognition, multimodality, conceptual
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1. Introduction
A common function of language is to describe actions. But how are
linguistically-mediated actions understood? A considerable amount of
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experimental evidence has supported the notion that the motor modality,
in particular, is involved in the comprehension of language about action.
That is, when a person hears or reads text involving action, there is acti-
vation of the motor system in his or her brain, which corresponds to the
referential semantic content of the description (e.g., Glenberg and Ka-
schak 2002; Zwaan and Taylor 2006). This ﬁnding has been referred to
as ‘‘indexing’’ (Glenberg and Robertson 1999) or ‘‘referential motor reso-
nance’’ (Fischer and Zwaan 2008). An alternative view maintains that
this approach and its e¤ects ‘‘can be explained by a disembodied view of
cognition if appropriate assumptions are made about the dynamics of
activation ﬂow between cognitive systems’’ and that ‘‘sensory and motor
information plays, at best, a supportive but not necessary role in repre-
senting concepts’’ (Mahon and Caramazza 2008). According to this
view, there most likely exists a level of abstraction above (or consisting
of ) multimodal representations (see Ghazanfor and Schroeder 2006 for
partial support). At ﬁrst glance, these two approaches appear to be com-
pletely at odds with one another. However, one goal of this paper is to
demonstrate how closely coupled the two approaches are. To begin laying
out our argument, we consider the neural overlap between action, imagi-
nation, and language comprehension.
2. Overlapping neural substrates underlie overt action, imagination, and
language comprehension
If the action system plays a role during the comprehension of action de-
scriptions, then action, the imagination of action, and the comprehension
of language about action should involve overlapping neural substrates.
Several functional-magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have in-
deed demonstrated that actively imagining an action is associated with
activation in motor and premotor regions of the cortex (e.g., Filimon
et al. 2007). Experiments using techniques with relatively high temporal
resolution, such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS; Buccino
et al. 2005; Pulvermu¨ller et al. 2005), magnetoencephalograms (MEG;
Pulvermu¨ller 2004; see Hauk et al. 2008 for a review), ﬁne-grained
movement-kinematic measures (Boulenger et al. 2006; Glover and Dixon
2002; Gentilucci and Gangitano 1998), and behavioral studies (Zwaan
and Taylor 2006; Glenberg and Kaschak 2002) converge to demonstrate
rapid, brief, automatic, and somatotopic (Pulvermu¨ller 2005) motor acti-
vation during or immediately following the presentation of language de-
scribing action. Often, this is the case even when the word is not deeply
processed (e.g., Pulvermu¨ller 2004; Boulenger et al. 2006 who only ex-
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posed participants to a word) and during online reading (e.g., Taylor and
Zwaan 2008). Given the spatial overlap (Raposo et al. 2009) between the
regions that are involved in the execution of overt actions (Penﬁeld and
Rasmussen 1950), active imagery (Postle et al. in press), viewing actions
(Calvo-Merino et al. 2005), and hearing, reading, and/or processing
action descriptions (Glenberg and Kaschak 2002; Zwaan and Taylor
2006; Kemmerer et al. 2008), a reasonable conclusion is that these pro-
cesses all rely on similar or partially overlapping, but probably not com-
pletely co-extensive brain regions.
Neurological data provide evidence for an important point. Lesioned
or dysfunctional motor neurons are associated with disrupted semantic
processing of action-related language. Although patients with such a¿ic-
tions are typically capable of some form of comprehension, this is proba-
bly suboptimal at best. For example, Parkinson’s patients, who typically
display motor deﬁcits while performing overt actions, have abnormal
lexico-semantic processing for action verbs, but not for concrete nouns.
When they are treated with Levodopa, which restores normal motor func-
tioning, they come to have relatively normal processing for both concrete
nouns and action verbs (Boulenger et al. in press). Likewise, patients with
clinically and electrophysiologically-conﬁrmed motor neuron disease have
consistent and selective impairment for both the comprehension and pro-
duction of verbs relative to nouns (Bak et al. 2001). Awaiting further neu-
ropsychological data, the claim that motor neurons are not necessary to
action-related language comprehension seems justiﬁed, as action word
processing is impaired, but still possible, when motor neurons themselves
are impaired. However, these data also support the claim that motor neu-
rons provide a unique and substantive portion of conceptual representa-
tions of linguistic constructions about actions.
The degree of motor involvement appears to depend on the depth of
semantic processing. An fMRI study revealed somatotopically organized
activation in motor and premotor areas for action execution, but not for
a ‘‘lexical task,’’ such as passive word viewing (Postle et al. in press). This
reﬂects a general pattern seen in fMRI studies; action execution and ob-
servation is often associated with detectible somatotopic organization
using fMRI, but comparable e¤ects are di‰cult to pin down for action
words (see Postle et al. in press for a review; however, see Ru¨schemeyer
et al. 2007, reviewed in the next section), speciﬁcally when relatively shal-
low processing tasks, such as lexical decision or passive word viewing, are
used. Conversely, a deeper semantic task (Semantic Similarity Judgment)
that requires participants to make very ﬁne-grained semantic judgments
(i.e. is trudge more similar to limp or stroll ?) reveals remarkably ﬁne-
grained organization in the cortex for action parameters such as whether
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an action involves motion, contact, change of state, or tool use (Kemmerer
et al. 2008). Given the poor temporal resolution of fMRI, ﬁnding pro-
cesses associated with accessing word meaning is a serious challenge to
researchers using that methodology (Postle et al. in press). With a su‰-
ciently deep semantic task, however, verb meaning and neural states
show a remarkable overlap that can be revealed with the superior spatial
resolution of fMRI (Kemmerer et al. 2008). Obviously, the issue of how
processing depth interacts with motor e¤ects during language comprehen-
sion warrants further exploration and research.
Brain imaging studies show that exposure to action words activates
motor and premotor areas (see Hauk et al. 2008 for a review). Unfortu-
nately, they do not o¤er su‰cient detail to provide decisive evidence vis a`
vis the claim that there is a high correspondence between the semantic
content of action-related language and activation in the motor system.
Behavioral studies are uniquely suited towards this end. Either premedi-
tated action-planning or semantic processing that is deeper than simple
word detection is su‰cient to cause priming between linguistic input and
goal-directed action; word-exposure (or lexical decision) alone has not
been found to prime a goal-directed action (Lindemann et al. 2006).
Dominant-handed responses to hand action verbs, relative to foot action
verbs, are disrupted during a semantic decision task, but not during a lex-
ical decision task and not (1000 ms) after a semantic decision has already
been made (Sato et al. 2008). During a reach-to-grasp movement visual
exposure to action verbs, relative to nouns denoting non-graspable ob-
jects, rapidly (within 200 ms) a¤ects the reaching action (Boulenger et al.
2006); nouns denoting graspable objects (Glover et al. 2004) and adjec-
tives describing size (Gentilucci and Gangitano 1998; Glover and Dixon
2002) have similar e¤ects on a reach-to-grasp movement. When judging
the sensibility of sentences describing actions towards and away from the
body, responses towards the body are faster when following a sentence
about an action towards the body (e.g., opening a drawer; Glenberg and
Kaschak 2002). When reading sentences about direction-speciﬁc manual
rotation (e.g., opening a jar) while engaging in manual rotation them-
selves, language users read action verbs faster when the sentence describes
rotation that is congruent with the action that they are performing during
reading (Zwaan and Taylor 2006).
Two important conclusions can be drawn exclusively from the behav-
ioral data. First, the neural activation associated with linguistic input, re-
viewed above, most likely codes for actions that bear a close resemblance
to those described by text. Second, this action-speciﬁc activation seems to
only become manifest during tasks that require a depth of comprehension
beyond simple word-detection or lexical decision (note the broad, often
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less-than-e¤ector-speciﬁc activation for shallow linguistic tasks; however,
see Ru¨schemeyer et al. 2007).
The literature reviewed above o¤ers support for a few key points. First,
overt actions, viewing actions, actively imagining actions, and reading
about actions most likely rely on overlapping neural substrates and pro-
cesses in motor and premotor cortical regions. Second, the neural activa-
tion observed during action word processing most likely codes for action-
speciﬁc activation that matches the semantic content of text with some
degree of precision beyond mere e¤ector-speciﬁcity. Third, while we can-
not say that healthy motor neurons are necessary for the comprehension
of language about action, we can fairly say that motor neuron deﬁcits in-
duce a quasi-normal and suboptimal sort of comprehension that is often
selective for verbs and action related language (e.g., Bak et al. 2001).
Taken together, the literature suggests that neural regions that code for
action performance are recruited to play a substantial role in the concep-
tual representation and semantic processing of language about action.
Two issues clearly warrant further research: (1) how the depth of seman-
tic processing a¤ects the degree to which the motor system is activated
during linguistic processing and (2) how comprehension works in people
with neuronal dysfunctions that clearly lead to sub-optimal processing.
Although the ﬁndings we have reviewed up to this point are intriguing
and lend credence to the claim that the motor system assists in or is re-
quired for the comprehension of language about action, a growing need
to uncover the linguistic constraints for language-based motor resonance
remains. Where and when in a stretch of language can we expect motor
resonance to occur? It is to this question that we turn next.
3. The Linguistic Focus Hypothesis
The goal of comprehending a stretch of language is normally the con-
struction of a mental representation of the referential situation, a situa-
tion model (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983; Zwaan and Radvansky 1998).
Language constitutes a set of cues for forming such mental representa-
tions. It does so by systematically and sequentially guiding attention to
aspects of the referential world (Langacker 2001; MacWhinney 2005;
Zwaan 2004). Under this view, the recruitment of motor representations
during comprehension occurs under the governance of linguistic construc-
tions, which direct focus on the referential world. There is initial evidence
for this Linguistic Focus Hypothesis (LFH) with regard to motor recruit-
ment (Taylor and Zwaan 2008; Zwaan et al. in press).
In one experiment (Zwaan and Taylor 2006, Experiment 4), partici-
pants read sentences about direction-speciﬁc manual rotation while
Action in cognition 49
manually rotating a knob in order to proceed through sentences in groups
of one to three words. When participants’ actual manual rotation
matched the direction of rotation described by the sentence, they were
faster to read the critical verb that disambiguated the direction of rotation
than when there was a mismatch between implied and actual rotation di-
rection. In a subsequent study (Taylor and Zwaan 2008) the same para-
digm was used, but the critical items were re-written such that the critical
verb was followed by an adverb. The adverbs were intended to maintain
focus on the action (e.g. quickly, slowly) in Experiment 1 and to direct fo-
cus towards the sentence subject (e.g. happily, obediently) in Experiment
2; this was done in accordance with the distinction made by linguists be-
tween action- and subject-modifying English adverbs (Nakamura 1997;
Jackendo¤ 1972). According to the LFH, sustained focus on the action
should be accompanied by sustained motor resonance while switching fo-
cus to the subject should not; the results supported this prediction (Taylor
and Zwaan 2008).
A further experiment (Taylor et al. 2008) explored an untested assump-
tion from Zwaan and Taylor (2006). The critical items in Zwaan and
Taylor’s (2006) Experiment 4 were designed such that the critical verb
consistently disambiguated the direction of manual rotation. The under-
lying assumption was that this would be critical or essential to facilitating
motor resonance compatible with the action. In the Taylor, Lev Ari, and
Zwaan (2008) experiment, the critical items (e.g. He examined the/
pie through/the microwave/window and/turned the/timer./The cooking/
time needed/to be/shorter [longer].) were designed such that the instance
of manual rotation was mentioned in the ﬁrst part of the sentence, but
without disambiguating information about the direction of rotation. The
direction of manual rotation was clariﬁed in a second sentence within
each item, but this relied on an inference being drawn by participants
(e.g. the cook turned the timer in order to reduce the remaining amount
of cooking time. Therefore, he turned the timer counter clockwise.). Also,
it is of interest to note that the critical disambiguating word in these items
is an adjective, not a verb or adverb, as in all previously reported ex-
periments using this methodology. The results supported the prediction
that motor resonance for rotation direction was associated with text
that disambiguated the direction of rotation (Taylor et al. 2008; see also,
Gentilucci and Gangitano 1998; Glover and Dixon 2002 for results sup-
porting the claim that adjectives referring to size rapidly a¤ect the motor
system).
Zwaan, Taylor, and de Boer (in press) provided further support for the
LFH. They incorporated manual rotation sentences in stories (in Dutch)
about a bank robbery. The critical sentences were descriptions of (1) ac-
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tions being performed, (2) actions having been performed in the past and
(3) actions intended to be performed. Motor resonance occurred only on
the ﬁrst two types of sentences. Zwaan and colleagues hypothesized that
the focus in the latter type of sentence was not on the action itself, but on
the preparation for it, which could not be detected by the rotation para-
digm. For example, preparing to start the car does not involve manual ro-
tation, but might involve taking the key out of one’s pocket and inserting
it into its slot. Moreover, in the ﬁrst two sentences, motor resonance oc-
curred as soon as su‰cient information about the action had accrued. Be-
cause of the nature of Dutch syntax, this was often before the main verb
in the sentence had been encountered. An example is Hij greep de dop/en
begon de ﬂes/open te draaien (He grasped the cap/and started the bottle/
to screw open). In sentences such as this, the preceding context and the
object noun provide su‰cient speciﬁcation of the action, while the auxil-
iary verb provides focus on the action. Thus, the LFH can explain the—
at ﬁrst sight counterintuitive—ﬁnding that motor resonance sometimes
does not occur on the action verb itself.
If language indeed systematically guides attention to di¤erent aspects
of a referential situation, then we would not expect e¤ects as those re-
viewed above to be limited to a single word class or to only occur in con-
junction with a single word class, such as verbs. Instead, when discourse
leads a language user to focus on an overt action that is being performed
in the referential world, then we should expect the motor system to be ac-
tivated. However, if the discourse focus is on a di¤erent aspect of the sit-
uation (e.g., the location or shape of an object or the mental state of a
protagonist), then we would expect no such activation. Consistent with
this claim is the ﬁnding that action words such as kick produced activa-
tion in corresponding motor areas of the brain when presented in isola-
tion and to a lesser extent when presented in literal sentences, but not
when presented in idiomatic phrases (e.g., kick the bucket; Raposo et al.
2009). Action verbs also do not produce motor resonance when they are
the base of an abstract word (Ru¨schemeyer et al. 2007). For example,
greifen (which literally means to grasp) produces motor activation, but
begreifen (which means to understand) does not. The literature reviewed
in this section o¤ers support to the LFH in that entire sentences, verbs,
adverbs, and adjectives induce motor resonance as a function of whether
the content of the sentence focuses on or disambiguates some element of
an overt action that is being performed in the referential world described
by discourse.
We are now in a position to advance a theoretical proposal with regard
to the role of the motor system in language comprehension, which we
outline in the following section.
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4. The Multimodality Hypothesis
Given the available data and after taking theoretical considerations into
account (e.g., Barsalou 2008), we should be prepared to say that motor
system activation is neither necessary nor su‰cient for understanding
action descriptions (see also Fischer and Zwaan 2008); however, this
does not warrant the conclusion that the motor system plays an insub-
stantial role in understanding action descriptions. The multimodality hy-
pothesis proposes that the representation of word meanings consists of
‘‘multimodal representations captured during experiences with its instan-
ces [being] reactivated to simulate how the brain represented perception,
action, and introspection associated with’’ a word or concept’s referent in
the world (Barsalou 2008). This hypothesis is consistent with the oc-
currence of suboptimal comprehension when one or more modalities
are dysfunctional or are otherwise incapable of contributing to a word’s
representation.
A series of examples may help to illustrate this point. In a recent con-
versation, one author of this paper spoke to the other author of a ‘‘double
lutz’’ being performed. The listening author had no idea what a double
lutz could be and could not remember ever hearing of it, but could ﬁgure
out that it was some action that could be performed by experienced ath-
letes. The listener could tell that the speaker’s sentence was grammatical,
but could not comprehend it in the same capacity that the speaker could.
Finally, during the conversation, the speaker explained that it was a
jump that an ice-skater could perform. After receiving a scant, purely ver-
bal description of what the action entailed (based on the speaker’s limited
experience of having seen double-lutzes performed on TV) the listener
could at least make sense of the preceding conversation and had some
level of comprehension of what was being described. The listener had
ice-skated before and had jumped before (though never on ice-skates).
This was enough for him to have some idea of what ‘‘double lutz’’ meant.
However, this very scant ‘‘comprehension’’ likely cannot hold a candle to
the comprehension that a professional ﬁgure skater, with years of experi-
ence double lutzing would have. Thus the non-expert listener can compre-
hend ‘‘double lutz’’ in context, but his comprehension is peculiar and
quasi-normal, or ‘‘impoverished and isolated’’ (Mahon and Caramazza
2008).
This example illustrates that a direct mapping between motor experi-
ence and semantic content is not necessary for what a normal person
would call comprehension. In fact, one would ﬁnd it quite di‰cult to
learn from reading a book if one required detailed experiential traces for
its entire referential content! After all, reading books is one avenue by
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which we learn new things about the world. An empirical ﬁnding sup-
ports this view. Motor areas for simple motor programs were activated
in non-expert language users reading about expert actions, whereas motor
areas for complex actions were activated in the experts (Beilock et al.
2008). Ostensibly, the understanding that some action was being per-
formed, presumably based on the knowledge of the other words in the
sentence and on the syntactic knowledge that the unknown word was a
verb, produced some form of motor resonance in the non-expert.
This ﬁts well with the treatment of the multimodality hypothesis dis-
cussed above, which allows for comprehension to go forward even if one
modality is completely ‘‘ignorant’’ or inexperienced within a given do-
main. This can occur if a concept consists of ‘‘multimodal representations
captured during experiences with its instances [being] reactivated to simu-
late how the brain represented perception, action, and introspection asso-
ciated with’’ a concept’s referent in the world (Barsalou 2008). For exam-
ple, visual experience can help us understand discourse about a high-
jumper breaking a world record, even if the motor system of a listener
has never been involved in performing a Fosbury ﬂop before.
The focus of this article is the comprehension of language about action.
At the risk of moving away from this focus, we will mention here that a
more comprehensive multimodal account that includes experiential traces
from several modalities (sensory, motor, emotional, and introspective)
may help to account for the representation of abstract concepts such as
‘‘300,012, incredulous, astute, theory, embodied, false, and on and on’’
(Mahon and Caramazza 2008). This ‘‘pure multimodality’’ approach
(Barsalou 2008) is, however, only one of what we see as ﬁve competing
approaches to accounting for the same phenomenon: the representation
of abstract concepts. A second, and closely related approach, is one pro-
posing that multimodal representation inherently requires a level of ab-
straction that either consists of, or is a level above, multimodal represen-
tation (Mahon and Caramazza 2008). A third approach, second-order
multimodality, holds that in order to account for some of these concepts,
it may be necessary to propose a model that allows for some concepts to
only be deﬁned in terms of other concepts, which are themselves more
directly grounded in experiential traces; a well-known example is that
‘‘zebra’’ could be grounded in terms of ‘‘horse plus stripes’’ (Harnad
1990). A fourth approach, metaphorical extension (Lako¤ 1987), holds
that abstract concepts are grounded in experiential traces (or ‘‘image
schemata’’ to be more precise), but those traces are largely limited to the
sensorimotor domain; time, for example, is represented as a function of
space (Boroditsky 2000). Finally, a ﬁfth approach, the modularity hy-
pothesis, maintains that there exists an abstract ‘‘language of thought,’’
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(Fodor 1983) that processes symbols in a way similar to a Chinese Room
(Searle 1980) and that meaning is extracted as a result of an encapsulated
process consisting of symbol manipulation.
Surely a harmony between the data, theoretical considerations, and our
own intuitions exists. However, ‘‘the goal of developing a theory of con-
cepts will not be served by collecting more of the same data’’ (Mahon and
Caramazza 2008). The key to moving forward, then, partially consists of
taking all of the available data into account and moving forward with the
most parsimonious account possible. We feel that the involvement of the
motor system in comprehending text about intentional actions provides
for a substantial portion of the ‘‘essence’’ of comprehension. Two key
questions for moving forward are (1) whether this is the result of a
straightforward learning mechanism (e.g. Hebb 1949) that pairs words
with referents and (2) whether and exactly how this representation scheme
scales up to ‘‘abstract’’ language.
We would like to propose an account for conceptual representation
that attempts to harmonize the data and some of the theoretical ap-
proaches outlined above, which we call the fault tolerant theory of concep-
tual representation. On hypothesis one, multimodality, the behavioral,
neuroimaging, and neuropsychological data suggest that comprehension
of action-related language without motor experience, or with dysfunc-
tional motor neurons, is quasi-normal and suboptimal, or impoverished
and isolated. On hypothesis two (Mahon and Caramazza 2008), the neu-
ropsychological data (e.g. Boulenger et al. in press) tell us that compre-
hension and deep semantic processing of action-related language is still
at least somewhat possible without relevant motor experience or fully
functional motor neurons. On hypothesis three, second-order multi-
modality, philosophical considerations (e.g. Harnad 1990) and examples
(e.g. ‘‘double lutz’’) tell us that comprehension can go forward with as
little as a scant deﬁnition of a novel verb, which we believe results in a
second-order multimodal representation. On hypothesis four, metaphori-
cal extension, the data tell us that users are less proﬁcient at performing
even a simple motor task when forced to activate an image schema that
contradicts the internal one that they have for a given concept (Casasanto
and Dijkstra submitted).
We propose, then, that language comprehension is fault tolerant be-
cause it beneﬁts from a multi-variegated representation system that in-
cludes literal experiential associations, such as clockwise manual rotation
and screwing in light bulbs (Zwaan and Taylor 2006), second-order multi-
modal representations, such as understanding ‘‘double lutz’’ as ‘‘an ice-
skating jump,’’ and metaphorical representations, such as ‘‘pride’’ acti-
vating an image schema for upward motion (Casasanto and Dijkstra
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submitted). If it is indeed the case that comprehending a text is tanta-
mount to the construction of a situation model, or a mental representa-
tion, of the state of a¤airs denoted by the text (van Dijk and Kintsch
1983), then language users are going to engage any information within
their memory that they have at their disposal to integrate the information
that appears within the text. If it is indeed the case that conceptual repre-
sentation is multi-variegated in this way, then we would expect comprehen-
sion to be possible even when one or two of the representation systems are
‘‘ignorant’’ of a given concept. Even without ever witnessing or performing
a ‘‘double lutz,’’ one can still understand text about double-lutzing, given
that one knows that it is the sort of jump a person does while on ice
skates. In other words, the comprehension system exhibits ‘‘graceful deg-
radation.’’ Having experience witnessing or performing an action leads to
a rich mental representation, which eases the construction of a situation
model of the described state of a¤airs, but comprehension is not rendered
impossible by the absence of such detailed and ﬁtting experiential traces.
A further example may help to illustrate the unique contribution that
‘‘embodied’’ (visual or motor) information can make to language com-
prehension. If a person had never witnessed an athlete performing a
high-jump and had never high-jumped himself, but did understand that
high-jumpers compete to jump over the highest bar, then they could un-
derstand the sentence, The athlete attempted to win the gold medal by
high-jumping over the bar. However, if the remainder of the discourse
required experiential knowledge to comprehend, then a person without
visual or motor experience would fail to construct an adequate situation
model. If a second sentence read, His form was slightly o¤ on his last at-
tempt and he injured his neck on the landing, a person who had never wit-
nessed nor performed a high-jump would have di‰culty understanding
how this is a reasonable outcome, as the Fosbury ﬂop is not an incredibly
intuitive way to jump over horizontal bars.
That comprehension is not an all-or-none phenomenon is becoming in-
creasingly apparent. If one is to comprehend a text, one must construct a
situation model of the described state of a¤airs. The situation model may
require background knowledge from any of the many mediums within the
multi-variegated conceptual representation system of the language user.
The athlete attempted to win the gold medal by high-jumping over the bar
only requires a scant deﬁnition of what high-jumping consists; . . . he in-
jured his neck on the landing requires a more-detailed background knowl-
edge about the form that Olympic high-jumpers use when high-jumping.
Obviously, a person’s ability to comprehend text can be absent, in the
case of a person who does not know the language in which the text ap-
pears, or it can be highly sophisticated, detailed, or masterful, in the case
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of the Nobel Laureate author, economist, or scientist. However, between
these two extremes, normal seven-year-olds have what we would call a ru-
dimentary ability to comprehend text. Normal high school graduates or
university students have an ability to make more ﬁne-grained semantic
distinctions and can therefore produce and comprehend more sophisti-
cated text. Normal university graduates and professionals have a still
more high-resolution semantic knowledge. The di¤erences between these
groups, we believe, is primarily inﬂuenced by background knowledge,
which comes from experience reading text and experience in the world.
Bringing the available data and theories together, comprehension,
according to the approach advocated by this paper, relies on a multi-
variegated system for conceptual representation that relies on experiential
memory (including motor, sensory, and intuitive experiential traces, e.g.
Barsalou 2008), second-order grounding within the semantic network
(e.g. Harnad 1990), and metaphorical extension (Lako¤ and Johnson
1980). For a given discourse that requires the construction of a situation
model to comprehend, one can not claim that any one of these parts of
the conceptual system is necessary or su‰cient for successful comprehen-
sion. This combination of representational options makes the comprehen-
sion system fault tolerant. Comprehension, then, can be likened to a table
with six or more legs. Each of the legs of the table represents a part of the
multi-variegated conceptual system and the degree to which the table is
horizontal and stable represents the success of comprehension. If one or
two legs of the table are removed, it may become less stable, but it will
most likely remain reasonably horizontal. However, as one removes the
legs, one-by-one, the table will eventually cease to be a table and compre-
hension will eventually become peculiar and quasi-normal. Thus, one un-
expected outcome of the research on motor involvement in language
comprehension is that it causes us to further scrutinize what it means to
‘‘comprehend language.’’
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